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Abstract
This paper models the housing sector, mortgages, and endogenous default and loan-
to-value ratio as well as nominal and real rigidities in a DSGE setting. We use data for
the period 1981-2006 to estimate our model using Bayesian techniques. We analyze how
an increase in risk in the mortgage market raises the default rate and spreads to the rest
of the economy, creating a recession. In our model two shocks are well suited to replicate
the subprime crisis and the Great Recession: the mortgage risk shock and the housing
demand shock. Next we use our estimated model to evaluate a policy that reduces the
principal of underwater mortgages. This policy is successful in stabilizing the mortgage
market and makes all agents better off.
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1 Introduction
The latest financial crisis has its origins in the housing sector. There was an increase in the
mortgage delinquency rate that put many financial institutions under distress. The bursting of
the housing bubble in the United States made it difficult for borrowers to repay their loans. As
a result, the seriously delinquent mortgage rate (more than 90 days past due and in foreclosure)
increased from around 2% of total loans in 2006Q3 up to almost 10% in 2010Q1, as shown in
Figure 1. Banks were forced to write down several hundred billions in bad loans. A credit
crunch followed that caused the failure of several financial institutions. There was a decrease
in the access to credit for households, house prices fell, and so did credit, consumption, and
housing investment. The turmoil in the housing sector spread over to the rest of the economy.
In this paper, we propose a model to analyze the transmission of an increase in mortgage
default to the rest of the economy, the quantitative effects of the transmission and spillovers,
and debt reduction policies that might mitigate these effects. First, we develop a comprehen-
sive DSGE model with the housing sector, mortgages, and endogenous default and we estimate
it using Bayesian techniques. Second, we use the estimated model to look at the effects of a
reduction in mortgage payments.
This is a medium-sized model which builds on the work of Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and
Forlati and Lambertini (2011). There are two types of households that differ in terms of their
discount factor: patient households (lenders) save and lend to impatient ones (borrowers). Bor-
rowers can take a loan for a fraction of the expected discounted future value of their houses.
In Iacoviello and Neri’s equilibrium, mortgages are always repaid. We assume instead, like in
Forlati and Lambertini, that the returns to housing are sensitive to both aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic risk. The housing investment is subject to a risk shock that determines the value of the
collateral. If the value of the collateral after the risky shock is lower than the repayment of the
loan, the borrower defaults on the mortgage. Lenders can observe the realized return only after
paying an auditing cost. The participation constraint implied by the financial contract makes
the rate of default on mortgages and the external finance premium countercyclical.
The entrance of subprime borrowers in the U.S. mortgage market between 2000 and 2006 is
captured with an increase in the standard deviation of idiosyncratic housing investment risk.
Because of this risk, some borrowers find themselves in a negative equity trap and default on
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Figure 1: Delinquency Rate in Percentage Points, United States, 1979Q4-2010Q1
their mortgages. The ensuing fall in house prices pushes more mortgages underwater and trig-
gers a credit crunch that reduces aggregate demand for housing and non-durable goods alike.
The economy experiences a recession. We estimate the model with U.S. data for the time period
1981Q1-2006Q4 using Bayesian techniques.
The Financial Stability Act of 2009 launched Making Home Affordable (MHA) in response to
the increase in the mortgage default rate. Among other programs the Home Affordable Modi-
fication Program (HAMP) was started. The objectives of this program are to help households
to avoid foreclosure, to stabilize the U.S. housing market, and to improve the economy. It con-
sists of loan modifications on the mortgage debt. The loan modifications are either permanent
reductions in the mortgage payments through a lowering of monthly payments or a reduction
in the mortgage rate.
In line with these events, we use the estimated model for policy evaluation. We study a re-
duction in the loan payment that writes off the underwater part of mortgages. We find that
this policy is effective in stabilizing the mortgage market and mitigating the macroeconomic
effects of mortgage risk shocks. For housing demand shocks, the policy stabilizes the mortgage
market but its effect on the aggregate economy is limited.
Following the work of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) introduce collateral constraints in a model with housing to analyze sources and con-
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sequences of fluctuations in the U.S. housing sector. In particular, Iacoviello (2005) develops
and estimates a monetary business cycle model with nominal loans and durable goods used as
collateral. The main features of this framework are: (1) collateral constraint tied to real estate
values (as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)); (2) nominal debt. These features result in a financial
accelerator mechanism. Iacoviello (2005) estimates this model using U.S. data from 1974Q1 to
2003Q2. He finds that there are feedback effects from shocks on housing preferences to non-
housing consumption. This effect is positive because of the collateral constraint; otherwise it
would be negative.
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) develop a DSGE model of the U.S. economy that includes the
housing sector and estimate their model using Bayesian techniques. The core of Iacoviello
and Neri’s framework, and that of ours, is a dynamic equilibrium model with neoclassical as-
sumption and nominal and real rigidities, as the seminal works of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). These papers do not model the housing sector
explicitly but they fit the U.S. data well. The housing features in Iacoviello and Neri’s work
builds on Iacoviello (2005). Their model is characterized by sectorial heterogeneity, as in Davis
and Heathcote (2005). It features the housing sector which produces new homes using cap-
ital, labor, and land, and the non-housing sector produces consumption goods and business
investment using capital and labor. On the demand side, housing can be used as collateral
for borrowing, as in Iacoviello (2005). Iacoviello and Neri find that housing demand and sup-
ply shocks explain about one-quarter of the volatility of both housing investment and housing
prices. They show that housing market spillovers to consumption and business investment have
become more important over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses the
methodology. Section 4 documents the characteristics of the model with the estimated param-
eters. In Section 5 we look at the sources of business cycle fluctuation. Section 7 we study the
effects of debt reduction. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
Our model has two sectors, durable and non-durable goods; two types of households, patient
(lender) and impatient (borrower); and endogenous default on mortgage contracts. In equi-
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librium, some mortgages are defaulted. We assume that the returns to housing are sensitive
to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk and that lenders can observe the realized return only
after paying an auditing cost. The participation constraint implied by the financial contract
makes the rate of default on mortgages and the external finance premium countercyclical. For
ease of comparison, we keep the same notation as Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure 1 of households. Households differ in terms of their discount
factor: patient households (lenders) save and lend to impatient ones (borrowers).
2.1.1 Lenders
Lenders maximize their lifetime utility function:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(βGc)
tzt
[
Γc ln(ct − ct−1) + jt lnht − τt
1 + η
(
n1+ξc,t + n
1+ξ
h,t
) 1+η
1+ξ
]
, (1)
where β is the discount factor, ct is consumption of non-durable goods, ht is consumption
of housing services, nc,t and nh,t are hours in the durable goods sector and housing sector,
respectively. The variables zt, jt, and τt denote the shocks to intertemporal preferences, housing
preferences, and to labor supply.1 The parameter  measures habit persistence, η is the inverse
of the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and ξ accounts for the imperfect substitution of hours
in the non-durable and housing sectors. Consumption grows at the rate Gc on the balanced
growth path and Γc = (Gc− )/(Gc−βGc) allows marginal utility of consumption to be equal
to 1/c in the steady state.
1Please see Appendix B for the functional forms of these and the following shocks that are not specified in
the main text.
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Lenders maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint:
ct + qtht + bt +
kc,t
Ak,t
+
∑
i=h,b
ki,t + pl,tlt =
Rt−1bt−1
pit
+ qt(1− δh)ht−1 +
∑
i=c,h
wi,tni,t
Xwi,t
(2)
+[Rh,tzh,t + 1− δk,h] kh,t−1 +
[
Rc,tzc,t +
1− δk,c
Ak,t
]
kc,t−1 + (pl,t +Rl,t)lt−1 + pb,tkb,t
+Divt − φt − a(zc,t)kc,t−1
Ak,t
− a(zh,t)kh,t−1.
Lenders choose non-durable goods ct, housing services ht, hours nc,t and nh,t, land lt, capital
in the consumption sector kc,t, capital kh,t and intermediate inputs kb,t in the housing sector,
lending bt (borrowing if positive), and capital utilization rates zc,t and zh,t. The price of housing
is qt, the price for intermediate inputs is pb,t, and the price of land is pl,t. Ak,t could be interpreted
as the investment-specific technology shock. Rt−1 is the nominal return on the riskless bond
and pit = Pt/Pt−1 is the money inflation rate in the non-durable sector. Real wages are wc,t
and wh,t, real rental rates are Rc,t and Rh,t, and depreciation rates are δk,c and δk,h. There
is monopolistic competition in the labor market, and Xwc,t and Xwh,t represent the markup
between the wage paid by the wholesale firm and the wage paid to the households. Final goods
firms and labor unions pay lump-sum profits Divt; φt is the capital adjustment cost, and a(zi,t)
is the convex cost of setting capital utilization rate to zi,t, which are specified in Appendix B.
2.1.2 Borrowers
Borrowers maximize their lifetime utility function:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
(β′Gc)tzt
[
Γ′c ln(c
′
t − c′t−1) + jt lnh′t −
τt
1 + η′
(
(n
′
c,t)
1+ξ′ + (n
′
h,t)
1+ξ′
) 1+η′
1+ξ′
]
, (3)
subject to their budget constraint:
c′t + qth
′
t + [1− Ft(ω¯t)]Rz,tbt−1 = bt +
∑
i=c,h
w′i,tn
′
i,t
X ′wi,t
+ (1− δh)[1−Gt(ω¯t)]qth′t−1 +Div
′
t. (4)
Variables and parameters with a prime refer to the borrowers who have a lower discount rate
than lenders (β′ < β). Rz,t is the state-contingent interest rate that non-defaulting borrowers
pay at time t on the loans bt−1 taken at time t− 1; it is an adjustable interest rate determined
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after the realization of the shocks and satisfies the participation constraint of the lenders. A
fraction of borrowers default on their mortgages and, as a result, lenders pay the monitoring
cost µ and seize a fraction Gt(ω¯t) of the borrowers’ housing stock by paying a monitoring cost µ.
The fraction of loans that is repaid to the lenders is denoted by [1−Ft(ω¯t)]. Div′t are specified
in Appendix B.
Each household consists of many members who are ex-ante identical. The household decides
how much to invest in housing and ω¯t, the threshold for default. Total housing investment is
equally assigned across the members of the household. Each household signs a contract with
the lender and then the idiosyncratic shock ωit+1 is realized. The shock defines the ex-post
value of the house ωit+1qt+1h
′
t. This captures the idea that housing investment is risky. The
idiosyncratic shock is i.i.d. across the household members and log-normally distributed with
the cumulative distribution function Ft+1(ω
i
t+1). The expected value of the ω
i
t+1 is equal to 1
in every period, there is no shock at the aggregate level. We assume that housing investment
riskiness can change over time: the standard deviation σω,t of lnω
i
t is subject to an exogenous
shock.
Once the idiosyncratic shock is realized, the borrower decides whether to default on the
mortgage or not. The borrower defaults if the idiosyncratic shock is such that the value of the
house is lower than mortgage repayment:
ω¯t+1(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1 = Rz,t+1 bt. (5)
Loans greater than this threshold value are repaid at the contractual rate Rz,t+1 and loans less
than the threshold value are underwater and are defaulted on. The random variable ωit+1 is
observed by the members of the household but lenders can only observe it after paying a cost.
Then, lenders pay the monitoring cost µ and seize the collateral on the loan. This makes the
borrowers truthfully reveal their idiosyncratic shock. Borrowers that default lose their housing
stocks. There is perfect consumption insurance among household members so that non-durable
consumption and housing investment are ex post equal across members of the household.
We assume a one-period mortgage contract as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
Lenders demand the gross rate of return Rt which is predetermined and not state contingent.
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The participation constraint of the lenders is
Rtbt =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1ft+1(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
Rz,t+1btft+1(ω)dω, (6)
where f(ω) is the probability density function of ω. Remember that ω is subject to an exogenous
shock to its standard deviation, making it time variant. The return on total loans consists of two
parts: the housing stock net of monitoring costs and depreciation of the defaulting borrowers
(first-term on the right-hand side of 6), and the repayment by the non-defaulting borrowers
(second-term on the right-hand side of 6). After the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are
realized, the threshold value ω¯t and the state-contingent mortgage rate Rz,t are determined.
The participation constraint holds state by state.
As in Forlati and Lambertini (2011) we define the expected value of the idiosyncratic shock
for those who default multiplied by the probability of default as
Gt+1(ω¯t+1) ≡
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1ft+1(ω)dω (7)
and the expected share of housing value, gross of monitoring costs that goes to lenders as,
Γt+1(ω¯t+1) ≡ ω¯t+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
ft+1(ω)dω +Gt+1(ω¯t+1). (8)
Then, the participation constraint, Equation (6) is,
Rtbt = [Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)] (1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1, (9)
where the loan-to-value ratio is
[Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)] . (10)
We derive Equation (9) in Appendix C. We also show another way of writing the borrowers’
budget constraint, Equation (4). Equation (9) states that the borrower can borrow, bt, up
to a fraction of the future value of the house. The loan-to-value ratio is such fraction; it is
determined endogenously and it is time-varying.
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Borrowers maximize their utility (3) subject to the budget constraint (4) and the borrowing
constraint (9). They choose c′t, h
′
t, bt, n
′
h,t, n
′
c,t, and ω¯t+1.
We follow Bernanke et al. (1999) and Forlati and Lambertini (2011) to specify the idiosyncratic
risk in the housing sector. The shock ω is distributed log-normally:
lnωt ∼ N
(
−σ
2
ω,t
2
, σ2ω,t
)
. (11)
2.2 Firms
There are competitive flexible price wholesale firms that produce non-durable goods and hous-
ing using two technologies. There is also a final good firm in the non-durable sector which
operates under monopolistic competition.
Wholesale firms hire labor and capital services and buy intermediate goods to produce whole-
sale goods Yt and new houses IHt to maximize their profits
Yt
Xt
+ qtIHt −
[∑
i=c,h
(wi,tni,t + w
′
i,tn
′
i,t +Ri,tzi,tki,t−1) +Rl,tlt−1 + pb,tkb,t
]
, (12)
where the production technologies are:
Yt =
[
Act
(
nαctn
′1−α
ct
)]1−µc
(zctkct−1)
µc , (13)
IHt =
[
Aht
(
nαhtn
′1−α
ht
)]1−µh−µb−µl
(zhtkht−1)
µh kµbbt l
µl
t−1. (14)
Xt is the markup of final good relative to wholesale non-durable good. Non-durable goods are
produced with labor and capital as in (13). New houses are produced with labor, capital, land,
and intermediate input kb as in (14). Act and Aht denote the productivities in the non-durable
and housing sectors.
2.3 Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy
There is price rigidity in the non-durable good sector and wage rigidities in the non-durable
good and housing sectors. We assume monopolistic competition at the retail level and price
stickiness a` la Calvo (Calvo, 1983). Retailers buy wholesale goods Yt from wholesale firms at the
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price Pwt in a competitive market, differentiate the goods at no cost, and sell them at a markup
Xt = Pt/P
w
t over the marginal cost. The CES aggregates of these goods are converted back
into homogeneous consumption and investment goods by households. Each period, a fraction
1 − θpi of retailers set prices optimally, while a fraction θpi cannot do so, and index prices to
the previous period inflation rate with an elasticity equal to ιpi . These assumptions deliver the
following consumption sector Phillips curve:
lnpit − ιpi ln pit−1 = βGc (Et lnpit+1 − ιpi ln pit)− εpi ln
(
Xt
X
)
+ up,t, (15)
where εpi = (1− θpi)(1− βGcθpi)/θpi and up,t is a cost shock.
Wage setting is similar to the price setting. Unions receive homogeneous labor supply from
borrowers and lenders. Then they differentiate the labor services and set wages a la Calvo.
Wholesale labor packers buy these labor services and assemble them into nc, nh, n
′
c, and n
′
h.
Wholesale firms hire labor from these packers. Under Calvo pricing with partial indexation
to past inflation, the pricing rules set by the union imply four wage Phillips curves that are
isomorphic to the price Phillips curve. These equations are in Appendix B.
To close the model, we assume that the central bank sets the interest rate Rt according to a
Taylor rule that responds to past interest rate, inflation, and GDP growth:
Rt = (Rt−1)rR
[
pirpit
(
GDPt
GcGDPt−1
)rY
r¯r
]1−rR uRt
st
, (16)
where r¯r is the steady-state interest rate, uRt is i.i.d. monetary policy shock, and st is persistent
inflation target shock.
2.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the goods market is as follows:
Ct +
IKc,t
Ak,t
+ IKh,t + kb,t = Yt − φt, (17)
where Ct = ct + c
′
t is the aggregate consumption, IKc,t = kc,t − (1 − δk,c)kc,t−1, IKh,t =
kh,t − (1− δkh)kh,t−1, and φt is described in Appendix B.
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New houses are produced in the housing market:
ht + h
′
t − (1− δh)
[
ht−1 + h
′
t−1 (1− µGt(ω¯t))
]
= IHt. (18)
Loan market also clears. Total land is fixed and normalized to one. The shocks are described
in Appendix B.
2.5 Trends and Balances Growth
To complete the model, we allow for different trends in productivity in the consumption, busi-
ness, and residential sector. The processes that they follow are:
lnAc,t = t ln (1 + γAC) + lnZc,t, where lnZc,t = ρAC lnZc,t−1 + uC,t;
lnAh,t = t ln (1 + γAH) + lnZh,t, where lnZh,t = ρAH lnZh,t−1 + uH,t;
lnAk,t = t ln (1 + γAK) + lnZk,t, where lnZk,t = ρAK lnZk,t−1 + uK,t;
The innovations are uC,t, uH,t, and uK,t and they have mean zero and standard deviations σAC ,
σAH , and σAK . The shocks are serially uncorrelated. The parameters γAC , γAH , and γAK are
the net growth rates of technology for each of the sectors. We estimate the last six parameters.
A balance growth path exists. We follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to define the growth rates
for the real variables; they are defined as
GC = GIKh = Gq×IH = 1 + γAC +
µC
1− µC γAK ; (19)
GIKc = 1 + γAC +
1
1− µC γAK ; (20)
GIH = 1 + (µh + µb)γAC +
µc (µh + µb)
1− µc γAK + (1− µh − µl − µb)γAH ; (21)
Gq = 1 + (1− µh − µb)γAC + µc (1− µh − µb)
1− µc γAK − (1− µh − µl − µb)γAH . (22)
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3 Parameter Estimates
3.1 Methods and Data
We take the linearized version of the equations around the balanced growth path and estimate
the model with Bayesian methods. The chosen prior distributions a discussed in Section 3.3, and
we estimate the posterior distributions using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We have eleven
observables: loan-to-value ratio, real consumption, real residential investment, real business
investment, real house prices, nominal interest rates, inflation, hours and wage inflation in the
consumption sector, hours and wage inflation in the housing sector. The variables are explained
in Appendix A. We measure the loan-to-value ratio following Boz and Mendoza (2014) and
define it as net credit market assets of households divided by the value of residential land from
Davis and Heathcote (2007).
We use quarterly data for the United States from 1981Q1 until 2006Q4, to exclude the financial
crisis period. However, we also experiment with the data until 2008Q4, before the nominal
interest rate reached the zero lower bound. We plot the data that we use in the estimation in
Figure 10 on page 44.
3.2 Calibrated Parameters
We present the parameters we calibrate in Table 1 and we follow Iacoviello and Neri (2010).2
The discount rate for borrowers is β = 0.9925, and the discount rate for lenders is β′ = 0.9700.
The weight on housing in the utility function j is equal to 0.12. The share of capital in the
non-durable goods production µc is set to 0.35. In the housing production capital share µh, the
share of land µl, and the share of intermediate goods µb are all set to 0.1.
We set the depreciation rates for capital in the non-durable goods sector δkc = 0.025, capital
in the housing sector δkh = 0.03, and the depreciation in the housing sector δh = 0.01. The
steady-state markups are equal to 15 percent, so we fix Xss, Xwc, and Xwh at 1.15. The
autocorrelation parameter for the cost shock ρs is fixed at 0.975. Finally, we set the monitoring
cost µ equal to 0.12 as in Forlati and Lambertini (2011).
2Please see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) for the details of the calibration.
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Parameter Value
β 0.9925
β′ 0.9700
j 0.1200
µc 0.3500
µh 0.1000
µl 0.1000
µb 0.1000
δkc 0.0250
δkh 0.0300
δh 0.0100
Xss 1.1500
Xwc, Xwh 1.1500
ρs 0.9750
µ 0.1200
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
3.3 Prior and Posterior Distributions
We present our prior distributions in Tables 2 and 3. Most of the priors have the same distri-
butions as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The only difference is the parameters that specify the
autoregressive part of the shocks i.e. ρ’s. We set the prior mean of these parameters to 0.5.
We specify a normal distribution for the mean of standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks in
the housing sector σ¯ω. The idiosyncratic shock itself is specified similar to the other shocks in
the model, i.e. the autoregressive parameter has a beta distribution with mean equal to 0.5 and
standard deviation equal to 0.1, and the standard deviation has an inverse gamma distribution
with mean 0.001 and a standard deviation of 0.01.
Tables 2 and 3 show the posterior distribution of the parameters and the shock processes,
respectively. Figures 18 to 22 in Appendix E present the plots of the prior and the posterior
distributions.
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Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean St. Dev. Mean 2.5% 97.5%
α beta 0.65 0.05 0.7440 0.6826 0.8014
 beta 0.5 0.075 0.4001 0.3182 0.4841
′ beta 0.5 0.075 0.5846 0.4764 0.6897
η gamma 0.5 0.1 0.5434 0.3819 0.7166
η′ gamma 0.5 0.1 0.5024 0.3485 0.6563
ξ normal -1 0.1 -0.7343 -0.9816 -0.5067
ξ′ normal -1 0.1 -0.9747 -1.1416 -0.8023
φk,c gamma 10 2.5 14.3053 11.3023 17.6198
φk,h gamma 10 2.5 10.9936 7.0095 14.9590
rpi normal 1.5 0.1 1.6608 1.5369 1.7787
rR beta 0.75 0.1 0.6828 0.6308 0.7377
rY normal 0 0.1 0.3739 0.2827 0.4665
θpi beta 0.667 0.05 0.8692 0.8421 0.8967
ιpi beta 0.5 0.2 0.5039 0.3090 0.6910
θw,c beta 0.667 0.05 0.8645 0.8351 0.8999
ιw,c beta 0.5 0.2 0.2381 0.1109 0.3583
θw,h beta 0.667 0.05 0.8867 0.8516 0.9205
ιw,h beta 0.5 0.2 0.4491 0.1810 0.7061
γAC normal 0.005 0.01 0.0048 0.0045 0.0051
γAH normal 0.005 0.01 0.0048 0.0041 0.0054
γAK normal 0.005 0.01 0.0011 0.0007 0.0016
ζ beta 0.5 0.2 0.8759 0.7818 0.9774
σ¯ω normal 0.1 0.005 0.1012 0.0934 0.1093
Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distribution of the Structural Parameters
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Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Parameter Distribution Mean St. Dev. Mean 2.5% 97.5%
ρAC beta 0.5 0.1 0.8648 0.8165 0.9123
ρAH beta 0.5 0.1 0.9418 0.9026 0.9862
ρAK beta 0.5 0.1 0.8840 0.8473 0.9177
ρj beta 0.5 0.1 0.9121 0.8826 0.9435
ρσω beta 0.5 0.1 0.8965 0.8657 0.9264
ρτ beta 0.5 0.1 0.7884 0.7053 0.8671
ρz beta 0.5 0.1 0.9434 0.9230 0.9642
σAC inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0089 0.0076 0.0103
σAH inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0168 0.0148 0.0189
σAK inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0123 0.0095 0.0150
σj inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0888 0.0607 0.1149
σR inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0017 0.0014 0.0021
σz inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0162 0.0121 0.0200
σω inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.2006 0.1692 0.2313
στ inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0412 0.0212 0.0641
σp inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0031 0.0025 0.0036
σs inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
σn,h inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0948 0.0830 0.1058
σw,h inv.gamma 0.001 0.01 0.0055 0.0047 0.0063
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Processes
4 Properties of the Estimated Model
4.1 Impulse Responses
Mortgage Risk Shock.- Figure 2 plots impulse responses to the estimated mortgage risk shock.3
The magnitude of the shock is equal to the mode of the estimated distribution, σω = 0.1927.
The mortgage risk shock is captured by an unanticipated increase in σω,t, the standard devia-
tion of the distribution of the idiosyncratic housing investment risk. An increase in mortgage
risk implies an increase in the default rate of borrowers and an increase in the monitoring
costs. Lenders require a higher interest rate from the borrowers who do not default on their
loans, because the participation constraint needs to be satisfied, and external finance premium
increases. Additionally, the loan-to-value of the borrowers decreases which in turn leads to a
tightening of the borrowing constraint of the borrowers. The worsening of financial conditions
leads borrowers to cut back on non-durable consumption, housing investment, and loans. The
housing demand of borrowers falls substantially; this drives the fall in house prices. Savers,
3Figure 11 in Appendix E plots additional variables.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to Mortgage Risk Shock
Dashed lines represent the mean of the posterior impulse responses; dotted lines indicate the 2
standard deviations confidence intervals.
who are consumption smoothers, can take advantage of the lower prices and increase housing
demand. Nevertheless, the large drop in the housing demand of borrowers dominates. The con-
sumption of lenders falls less than the consumption of borrowers because the borrowers bear all
the risk in this type of contract. Savers also reduce lending due to lower interest rates. Overall,
total consumption and output fall. Business investment falls but the magnitude is not much.
The wages in both sectors are lower both for borrowers and lenders. Wages for borrowers fall
more than lenders. Savers and borrowers work less.
Housing Preference Shock.- Next, we analyze impulse responses to a housing preference shock
in Figure 3.4 It is, as Iacoviello and Neri (2010) call it, a housing demand shock. A higher
housing demand leads to an increase in housing prices and in housing investment. The collateral
capacity of the borrowers increases, and also the wages for borrowers in both sectors increase
and they work more. These together allow the borrowers to consume more. The default rate
of the borrowers and the monitoring costs of the lenders are lower. Lenders require a lower
4Figure 12 in Appendix E plots additional variables.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Housing Preference Shock
Dashed lines represent the mean of the posterior impulse responses; dotted lines indicate the 2
standard deviations confidence intervals.
external finance premium. The nominal interest rate is higher and lenders give out more loans.
Savers decrease housing demand and consumption. The decrease in housing is too small to
change the sign of the total demand. Aggregate consumption increases because it is driven
mainly by the borrowers’ non-durable consumption.
Housing Technology Shock.- Impulse responses to a housing technology shock are presented in
Figure 4.5 A positive shock to housing technology results in higher housing investment and
lower housing prices. The fall in house prices decreases the collateral capacity of the borrowers.
The default rate is higher, so are the monitoring costs and the external finance premium (not on
impact because the risk free rate of return is predetermined). Lenders cut back their loans. They
increase their housing demand and decrease their non-durable good consumption. Borrowers
consume less non-durable goods.
Savers’ wages in the housing sector go up and they work more; their wages in the non-durable
goods sector decrease and they work less (on impact). Borrowers’ wages in the housing sector
5Figure 13 in Appendix E plots additional variables.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Housing Technology Shock
Dashed lines represent the mean of the posterior impulse responses; dotted lines indicate the 2
standard deviations confidence intervals.
also go up and so do hours; in the consumption sector they move on different direction. Total
hours of savers and borrowers increase in the housing sector and decrease in the non-durable
sector; investment in the different sectors co-moves with total hours. More resources go into the
durable sector. Aggregate output in the non-durable sector falls. Overall there is an increase
in housing and real GDP goes up.
An interesting characteristic of the impulse responses is the high persistence of the housing
prices to the estimated shock; this is due to the high posterior mean of the autocorrelation
parameter of the housing technology shock, ρAH = 0.9474.
6
Monetary Policy Shock.- Figure 5 plots the impulse responses to an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.7
The nominal interest rate goes up. Non-durable good consumption, real business and housing
investment fall. Housing investment falls the most and is followed by business investment and
consumption, as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The consumption of savers falls because they are
consumption smoothers. Consumption of borrowers drops due to two reasons. First, credit is
6However, our estimated value is lower than Iacoviello and Neri’s, ρAH = 0.997, prompting a faster return
to the steady-state.
7Figure 14 in Appendix E plots additional variables.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to Monetary Policy Shock
Dashed lines represent the mean of the posterior impulse responses; dotted lines indicate the 2
standard deviations confidence intervals.
more expensive. Second, the price of consumption goods falls and real debt is higher. Borrowers
also have to reduce housing demand and hours worked. There is a negative wealth effect for
the borrowers.
Total demand in the housing sector falls and housing prices drop, too. More borrowers default:
for a larger fraction of members of the households the value of their house is lower than the
value of their debt. Monitoring costs increase and so does the interest rate that borrowers pay.
Lenders substitute loans with housing demand. The loan-to-value rate increases, as expected.
As aggregate demand falls, the wages in all sectors go down and both borrowers and lenders
work less.
4.2 Business Cycle Properties
In Table 4, we present the business cycle statistics of our estimated model. Panel A reports the
standard deviations, and Panel B reports the correlations. All standard deviations of the data
are within the 95% of the probability interval computed from the model. The correlations of
the variables are also well-replicated by our model.
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Model
Median 2.5% 97.5% Data
Panel A. Standard deviations
C 1.13 0.82 1.65 0.90
IH 7.52 5.95 10.03 7.16
IK 4.00 3.12 4.91 4.51
LTV 3.86 3.13 5.01 1.36
q 1.88 1.42 2.58 1.59
pi 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.26
R 0.24 0.18 0.31 0.27
GDP 1.79 1.19 2.36 1.63
Panel B. Correlations
C,GDP 0.73 0.37 0.85 0.83
IH,GDP 0.57 0.27 0.77 0.64
IK,GDP 0.87 0.75 0.94 0.80
q,GDP 0.57 0.18 0.83 0.45
q, C 0.34 -0.08 0.69 0.43
q, IH 0.64 0.34 0.81 0.49
Table 4: Business Cycle Properties of the Model
5 Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations
In Table 5, we present results from the forecast error variance decomposition. We find that
housing demand (housing preference) shocks explain more than half of the variance in house
prices. However, housing supply (housing technology) does not explain much of the variation in
house prices. Each of these shocks explains more than a third of housing investment. Technology
shocks in the non-durable sector explain investment in that sector.
Mortgage risk shocks explain about 88% of the variation in loan-to-value ratio, however it
explains little of the other variables. We are adding one observed variable and one shock, and
the shock explains the variables. However, our estimation does not include the crisis period
and therefore does not capture the transmission of shocks from the mortgage market to the rest
of the economy. In fact, the loan-to-value ratio and the default rate fluctuate little at business
frequency until 2007.
Consumption is mainly driven by inter-temporal preference and cost-push shocks; output is
driven by technology shocks in the non-durable sector and cost-push shocks. In Figure 17 in
the Appendix, we show the visual representation of the forecast error variance decomposition
for the loan-to-value ratio.
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As we expressed in Equations (19) to (22), business investment, residential investment, and
uc uh uk uj uR
C tech. H tech. IK tech. H pref. i.i.d. monetary
C 12.41 0.16 1.56 0.38 12.35
IH 1.15 38.70 0.27 43.40 4.53
IK 5.07 0.05 57.76 0.05 8.09
LTV 0.16 0.51 0.04 8.21 1.05
q 4.43 3.18 0.58 66.04 5.51
pi 5.01 0.06 1.13 0.25 1.94
R 4.68 1.91 15.31 3.79 20.59
GDP 10.78 3.67 21.85 5.90 15.31
uz uτ up us uω¯
Intert. Pref. L supply Cost-push Infl. Objt. Default
C 30.07 12.90 19.74 6.01 4.42
IH 3.82 4.57 1.95 1.41 0.20
IK 7.98 4.16 13.06 3.75 0.03
LTV 0.45 0.05 0.23 0.44 88.86
q 7.45 2.50 8.13 1.84 0.33
pi 4.37 1.98 69.42 15.43 0.42
R 8.87 3.42 26.32 13.33 1.80
GDP 0.91 12.68 21.08 6.84 0.98
Table 5: Asymptotic Variance Forecast Error Decomposition
consumption have different trends. We estimate these trends and we compare them with the
data. Figure 6 shows the results. In line with the data, we find that real business investment
has a faster technological progress than real consumption and real residential investment. The
lower rate in the construction sector can be explained by the trend in real house prices. One of
the reasons for the increase in house prices is the price of land which is a factor that limits the
construction of new homes. We present robustness checks in Appendix D.
6 The Subprime Crisis, the Great Recession, and the
Model
Our main point of departure from the work of Iacoviello and Neri is the modeling of the mortgage
market. We introduced the mortgage risk shock, default, and an endogenous loan-to-value ratio
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Figure 6: Estimated Trends
Dashed lines represent the median, 2.5 percentiles, and 97.5 percentile of the posterior distri-
bution of the estimated trends. The solid line is the data.
to capture the macroeconomic effects of the subprime crisis. In this section we analyze whether
and to what extent our model can replicate the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables
during that period.
Two shocks appear better suited to explain the subprime crisis: the mortgage risk shock and
the housing demand shock. The mortgage risk shock mimics well the entrance of subprime
borrowers into the mortgage market. The housing preference shock has been previously used in
the literature to explain the housing market bust. We use our estimated model and these two
shocks only to replicate the behavior of specific variables during the crisis. We do this exercise
for one shock at a time. We generate the time series of mortgage risk shocks that matches
a quarter of the five-period moving average of house prices. We match the moving average
because house prices are characterized by high volatility. For the housing preference shocks, we
choose the path of the shock that matches half the movement of the loan-to-value ratio.
We present the results of these exercises in Figure 7. The solid black line is the data. We
use HP-filtered U.S. data for aggregate consumption, housing investment, business investment,
and GDP.8 The other variables are treated by taking their natural log. We plot the data from
8GDP is calculated as the weighted sum of these three components, with the weights being the average
contribution of each component to this synthetic measure over the sample period.
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Figure 7: Mortgage Risk Shocks and Housing Preference Shocks explain the Great Recession
2006Q4 until 2012Q1; we normalize the data with respect to 2006Q3. We use the estimated
model until 2006Q4 and we do out-of-sample exercises. The red dashed thick line represents
what the model generates with only mortgage risk shocks. The blue dashed thin line is what
our estimated model generates with only housing preference shocks.9
The results show that the two shocks complement each other and explain different character-
istics of the subprime crisis and the Great Recession. On one hand, the sequence of mortgage
risk prompts households to reduce consumption, which falls as much as in the data. Housing
investment falls and so do the housing prices and GDP. This path of shocks does a good job at
matching the behavior of aggregate consumption and GDP. However, the mortgage risk shocks
cannot match the size of the fall in house prices and residential investment; the loan-to-value
ratio moves on the opposite direction than the data. This is because, as shown in Figure 2,
loans fall more than house prices. In our model, as in Forlati and Lambertini (2011), loans last
one period and they are sharply reduced in response to a fall in house prices. In the data, on the
other hand, the vast majority of mortgages have a fixed thirty-year term. When house prices
9We avoid matching exactly the data because it prompts excessive response for certain variables. For mort-
gage risk shocks that match the moving average of housing prices, the loan-to-value ratio falls 250% from its
trend; while for housing preference shocks housing investment falls up to 120% of its trend.
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started falling in 2007, the value of the collateral dropped while outstanding mortgage liabil-
ities did not, prompting an increase in the loan-to-value ratio.10 On the other hand, housing
preference shocks are better at explaining the path of the housing market and the loan-to-value
ratio, but they fail to generate a fall in consumption. Negative housing demand shocks make
households substitute durable goods (houses) for non-durable goods (consumption). The de-
crease in the demand for housing generates a precipitous fall in housing investment and prices
and an increase in the loan-to-value ratio but it also generates a counter-factual increase in
non-durable consumption. As a result, this path of housing demand shocks captures well the
general behavior of the housing market, although it overestimates its response, but it fails to
account for the transmission to aggregate consumption and thereby GDP.
Both sequences of shocks lead to a contraction in business investment but cannot replicate
the magnitude of the response in the data. Fitting business investment data during the crisis is
a challenge for this class of models because they lack a borrowing constraint on entrepreneurial
borrowing. Liu, Wang and Zha (2013) assume that entrepreneurs’ borrowing is limited to a
fraction of the value of land and capital collateral and include land as a factor of production.
Their model mimics well the fall in business investment in 2007-08. In their model the fall
in land prices tightens the borrowing constraint of firms, thereby depressing business invest-
ment. This direct channel helps replicating the dynamics of business investment during the
crisis. Their model, however, does not feature explicitly the housing sector with residential
investment, which plunged by almost 60% in the crisis, and mortgage default, which increased
fivefold.
7 Policy Analysis
We use the model estimated until 2006Q4 to evaluate a mortgage modification policy carried
out in response to a mortgage risk shock. We focus on policies that reduce the rate of default
by targeting marginal mortgages, namely the mortgages with the smallest (in absolute value)
negative equity. In the absence of policy all homeowners experiencing an idiosyncratic shock
below ω¯t default on their mortgages. When the policy is active ω¯t, as still determined by
Equation (9), can be interpreted as the natural threshold level at which homeowners would
10See the discussion in Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2015).
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start defaulting. The policy we consider lowers default by choosing ωt < ω¯t and reducing
mortgage payment for households between these thresholds so as to eliminate their negative
equity exposure. The payment reduction for household ωt, conditional on ωt < ωt < ω¯t, is
(ω¯t − ω)qth′t−1pit(1− δh)
and the total policy intervention is
Pt =
∫ ω¯t
ωt
(ω¯t − ω)qth′t−1pit(1− δh)(1 + µ′)ft(ω)d(ω).
This policy can be interpreted as a targeted mortgage modification with principal reduction.
Notice that principal is reduced just enough to make homeowner ω prefer repayment over
default. Smaller values of ωt generate lower default rates in equilibrium but imply larger
intervention costs. The parameter µ′ ≥ 0 captures the costs of the mortgage modification
program. These are the costs of monitoring and processing the applications.
The participation constraint of lenders, Equation (6), becomes:
Rtbt =
∫ ωt+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δ)qt+1h′tpit+1ft+1(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ωt+1
Rz,tbtft+1(ω)dω.
Since ωt+1 is smaller than the natural threshold ω¯t+1, default is lower than it would have been
in the absence of policy. The budget constraint of borrowers, Equation (4), now becomes:
c′t + qth
′
t + [1− Ft(ωt)]Rz,tbt−1 = bt +
∑
i=c,h
w′i,tn
′
i,t
X ′wi,t
+ (1− δh)[1−Gt(ωt)]qth′t−1 +Div
′
t.
Let
Γ˜t(ω¯t, ωt) ≡ ω¯t [1− Ft(ωt)] +Gt(ωt).
Using this definition and substituting the incentive-compatibility constraint, Equation (9), the
participation constraint can be rewritten as
Rtbt =
[
Γ˜t(ω¯t, ωt)− µG(ωt)
]
(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1. (23)
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We consider policies that respond to a mortgage risk shock; for the choice of ωt we assume
ωt = ω¯t − φ0σω,t − φ1(σω,t − σ¯ω), (24)
where φ0, φ1 are positive parameters, σω,t is the mortgage risk shock, and σω,t is the time-varying
standard deviation of housing investment risk. Intuitively, our mortgage policy remains active
as long as the volatility in the mortgage market is high. The marginal threshold ωt is kept
below its natural counterpart as long as the standard deviation of housing risk σω,t is above
its steady-state level. Our policy allows for an additional, contemporaneous response φ0 to
the mortgage risk shock; this feature helps reducing the default rate at time t but it is not
necessary. The policy is unexpected but once it starts at t agents correctly anticipate that the
policy will be effective until the volatility in the mortgage market subsides.
Our benchmark scenario assumes that savers bear the cost of mortgage modification, which
is paid in the form of a lump-sum tax. Their budget constraint, Equation (2), becomes:
ct + qtht + bt +
kc,t
Ak,t
+
∑
i=h,b
ki,t + pl,tlt =
Rt−1bt−1
pit
+ qt(1− δh)ht−1 +
∑
i=c,h
wi,tni,t
Xwi,t
+[Rh,tzh,t + 1− δk,h] kh,t−1 +
[
Rc,tzc,t +
1− δk,c
Ak,t
]
kc,t−1 + (pl,t +Rl,t)lt−1 + pb,tkb,t
+Divt − φt − a(zc,t)kc,t−1
Ak,t
− a(zh,t)kh,t−1 − Pt.
In Figure 8 we present the impulse responses to same mortgage risk shock analyzed in Figure
2.11 We assume that µ′ = µ = 0.12, φ0 = 0.05, φ1 = 1 in this exercise. We do not have estimates
for the value of µ′ upon which to rely, so we set the cost of monitoring applications for mortgage
reduction equal to the monitoring cost we estimated. Although plausible, we regard this value as
high so that our results can be interpreted as the lower bound on the effectiveness of the policy.
The first subplot displays the response of the threshold ω¯ in the absence of policy (solid blue
line) and of ω with policy (dashed red line). Reducing the principal for marginal homeowners
has strong effects on the mortgage market: on impact default jumps above 4 percentage points
on annual basis instead of 10 percentage points. Lower default reduces the adjustable mortgage
rate Rz and the external finance premium; the contraction of the LTV is also contained so that
11Figure 15 in Appendix E plots additional variables.
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Figure 8: Impulse Responses to Mortgage Risk Shock with Policy Intervention
borrowers do not need to deleverage as much. Overall borrowers’ financial conditions worsen
far less when the policy is in place, which in turn mitigates the sharp fall in their demand
for houses. The policy has important effects on the real economy as aggregate consumption,
housing and business investment, and GDP display far smaller reductions. By reducing default,
the policy reduces the losses stemming from foreclosure and monitoring. These costs are borne
ultimately by borrowers via higher mortgage rates and a reduced capacity to borrow. The key
reason for the milder recession is that financial conditions of borrowers do not deteriorate as
much under the policy.
Interestingly, savers’ consumption falls less under the policy even though it is these agents
that bear its cost. There are two reasons for this effect. First, the size of the intervention
is very small. Initially the policy reaches 5.2 percent (on an annual basis) of the outstanding
mortgages and, over the first 40 quarters, less than 9 percent of mortgages are modified. More
importantly, loan modifications are relatively small because only the underwater part of each
mortgage is forgiven. In the first quarter, the cost of the policy in terms of GDP, Pt/Yt, reaches
0.043 percentage points; the total (not discounted) cost over the first 10 years is 0.19 percentage
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points of GDP.
The last three subplots of Figure 8 display the impulse response of the lifetime utility of savers,
Equation (1), the lifetime utility of borrowers, Equation (3), and social or aggregate lifetime
utility calculated as
u˜t = (1− β)ut + (1− β′)u′t.
These impulse responses are obtained from the second-order approximation of the model. Both
borrowers’ and savers’ expected lifetime utility are higher at the time of shock under the policy.
Hence the policy is Pareto-improving over the lack of policy response. If given the choice, both
agents would therefore choose to undertake the policy when the mortgage risk shock arises.
Four quarters after the shock, however, borrowers’ lifetime utility with policy intersects and
becomes lower than lifetime utility without policy. On the other hand, savers are strictly better
off with the policy over the entire horizon. These welfare effects stem from the rebound of the
housing sector without policy, which leads to an increase in borrowers’ wages12 and a more
pronounced increase in non-durable consumption for these agents. Impatient agents’ welfare
is affected more than patient ones’ by a mortgage risk shock, as attested by the responses in
Figure 8. This is not surprising as impatient agents face a borrowing constraint and allocate a
larger fraction of their income to housing. This explains why aggregate lifetime utility mimics
that of borrowers even though there is an identical mass of either type of agents in our model.
We now evaluate our mortgage modification policy in response to a housing demand shock.
The policy we consider is
ωt = ω¯t − φ0uj,t − φ1(jt − j), (25)
where uj,t is the housing demand shock at t. For this exercise we calibrate φ0 = −0.01 and
φ1 = −0.075; the housing demand shock is negative and our policy reduces the default rate as
long as housing preferences are below their steady-state level. The size of the housing demand
shock is chosen to match the largest increase in loan-to-value ratio documented in Figure 7 and
Figure 9 illustrates the impulse responses to this shock.13 The mortgage market is stabilized
thanks to a substantial reduction of the default rate and the external finance premium; as a
result, loans and consumption fall less. However, the policy has no effect on house prices and
12See Figure 15.
13The responses of additional variables is shown in Figure 16 in appendix E.
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to Housing Demand Shock with Policy Intervention
residential investment. Lower house prices and investment are optimal equilibrium responses
to a shift in preferences away from housing toward non-durable consumption and programs
designed to contain mortgage default cannot (and should not) eliminate them. Because the
policy has no effect on residential investment, it also has limited effect on GDP. Welfare of
both agents falls in response to the housing demand shock, which enters in the utility function
directly. Our mortgage modification policy has a positive but small effect on borrowers’ welfare
thanks to the reduction in default, but no effect on savers’ welfare.
To sum up, a mortgage modification program that reduces the principal of borrowers on the
brink of default is successful in stabilizing the mortgage market and improving welfare. The
default rate and the external finance premium are substantially reduced; de-leveraging is halved.
If the mortgage market disturbance is the result of riskier mortgages, the modification program
can mitigate the impact on house prices and the transmission of the volatility to the aggregate
economy. On the other hand, if the mortgage market disruption is driven by a negative housing
demand shock, a sharp contraction in residential investment, house prices and GDP cannot be
avoided.
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7.1 Making Home Affordable?
In response to the crisis in the housing market the Financial Stability Act of 2009 launched Mak-
ing Home Affordable (MHA), which included Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP),
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and Home Affordable Foreclosure Alterna-
tives (HAFA). Overall, the goals of MHA are to help households to avoid foreclosure, to stabilize
the U.S. housing market, and to improve the economy. HARP allows borrowers to refinance
their mortgages even if they have insufficient equity to qualify for traditional refinance. To
qualify for HARP borrowers must be current on their payments; mortgages must be owned or
guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac; and loans had to be originated before June 2009. In
response to low participation in the program, loans of 20 years or less and with LTVs greater
than 125 percentage points were made eligible for the program, and some fees were eliminated.
HAMP helps homeowners to avoid foreclosure by facilitating permanent modifications to their
mortgages by extending the term, reducing the mortgage rate, or reducing the principal. HAMP
reduces monthly payments for qualifying borrowers to 31 percent of their income; these modi-
fications are made possible by paying incentives to servicers and lenders. HAFA provides two
alternative to foreclosure (short sale or Deed-in-Lieu of foreclosure). The application deadline
for MHA programs has been set to the end of 2015.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury publishes MHA Program Performance Reports and
MHA Data Files on a monthly basis. The reports summarize basic figures for HAMP and
HAFA but give no information on HARP; MHA Data Files consists of three sets of loan-level
mortgage modification data: First Lien, Second Lien, and HAFA. We focus on the results of
HAMP, First and Second Lien Modifications, to draw a comparison with the policy analyzed
in the previous section.
There are important differences between the actual policy and ist theoretical counterpart in our
model that make a comparison difficult. In particular, mortgages last one quarter in our model
while their duration is typically 20 to 30 years in the data. A permanent modification to a 30-
year contract can hardly be compared to a modification that lasts just one quarter in the model.
For this reason we consider the cumulated modification measures, both in our model and in the
data. In addition to this, permanent modifications under HAMP follow a series of waterfall steps
that include interest rate adjustment, term extension and principal forbearance. According to
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the MHA Program Performance Report Through May 2014,14 about one-third of all permanent
modifications feature principal forbearance, 64 percent term extension and 96 percent interest
rate reduction. Our policy, on the other hand, uses only principal forbearance. For this reason
we compare HAMP and our policy in terms of unpaid principal after modification.
We focus on our policy in response to a mortgage risk shock and draw some comparison with
HAMP. According to the Performance Report through May 2014 and the related data files:
1. 954,694 mortgages have received permanent modification through HAMP. This is to say
that 21 quarters after its inception, the policy has reached almost 2 percent of total
outstanding mortgages. The corresponding number in our policy, namely the cumulated
fraction of modified mortgages up to 21 quarters after the shock, is 8.1 percent.
2. There were 228,802 HAMP modifications with principal reduction; the total outstanding
principal balance reduction amounted to USD 14,209,424,479. This represents 0.1 percent
of total mortgage debt outstanding as of 2014Q1. After 21 quarters our policy reduced
the principal balance by 0.3 percent of mortgage debt.
3. According to the data, the median unpaid balance after modification is USD 223,517
against USD 242,443 before modification, which implies an 8 percent reduction in the
unpaid principal. In our model, the median reduction in the unpaid principal after 21
quarter is 27 percent of the balance before modification.
The policy in our model reaches a larger fraction of mortgages and it reduces the principal
of underwater mortgages more aggressively, both in terms of total and median principal for-
bearance, relative to HAMP. Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, Piskorski and
Seru (2012) examine the impact of HAMP on various margins of renegotiation rates and on
broader outcomes such as house prices. This study finds a fairly negligible increase in the rate
of permanent modifications and reduction in the rate of foreclosure as a result of HAMP; it is
also finds no evidence that house prices and other macroeconomic variables were affected in the
regions more exposed to the program and cite lack of responsiveness by some large servicers to
the financial incentives as the main reason for this shortfall. Further analysis of the details of
142014 MHA Program Performance Reports are available at the U.S. Department of the Treasury web site.
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modifications could shed light on the limited success of the program and provide guidance in
designing such policies in the future.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a model with housing and endogenous default on mortgages that we estimate
using Bayesian techniques. We first evaluate the estimated model through the analysis of the
first order approximation of the model to different shocks. Second, we compare the results of
the estimated model with the data. The estimated model matches the volatility of the real
variables and the trend of the housing sector. Then we make an out-of-sample forecast exercise
with out estimated model and analyze whether it can replicate the behavior of the mortgage
market and other main macroeconomic variables during the subprime crisis and the ensuing
Great Recession. We find that a significant increase in the riskiness of mortgages and a negative
housing demand shock complement each other in fitting different aspects of the crisis. Finally
we use our estimated model for policy evaluation. A program that reduces the principal of
mortgages on the brink of default stabilizes the mortgage market and makes all agents better
off. The policy is effective in reducing the macroeconomic consequences of a mortgage risk
shock; on the other hand, the response of house prices and residential investment to a housing
demand shock is optimal and unaffected by the policy.
We have estimated our medium-sized model over the period 1981Q1 to 2006Q4, which excludes
the housing bust that started in 2007 and the ensuing recession. Since the estimation sample
is characterized by little fluctuation in the loan-to-value ratio and the mortgage default rate,
shocks that originate in the mortgage market play a minor role in explaining the volatility of the
main macroeconomic variables during normal times; their role in crisis time, however, is likely to
be underestimated. A symptom of this problem is that the mortgage risk sequence that matches
the behavior of house prices and residential investment largely overestimates the fall in aggregate
consumption. This issue points to the tension of using medium-sized models estimated during
normal times for policy analysis during crises periods. Possible ways to overcome this problem
are to estimate the model over periods, or including periods, characterized by high turbulence
or resorting to different models. This is an important question that we leave to future research
efforts.
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A Appendix: Data and Sources
Aggregate Consumption Real Personal Consumption Expenditure (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2000 dollars), divided by the Civilian Noninstitutional Population Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Business Fixed Investment Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (seasonally ad-
justed, billions of chained 2000 dollars, per capita. Source: BEA.
Residential Investment Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (seasonally adjusted, bil-
lions of chained 2000 dollars) per capita. Source: BEA.
Inflation Quarter on quarter log differences in the implicit price deflator for the non-farm
business sector, demeaned. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Nominal Short-term Interest Rate 3-month Treasury Bill Rate (Secondary Market Rate),
expressed in quarterly units, demeaned. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Real House Prices Census Bureau House Price Index (new one-family houses sold including
value of lot) deflated with the implicit price deflator for the non-farm business sector.
Source: Census Bureau.
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Hours in Consumption Sector Total Non-farm Payrolls less all employees in the construc-
tion sector, times Average Weekly Hours of Production Workers, per capita. Demeaned.
Source: BLS.
Hours in Housing Sector All Employees in the Construction Sector, times Average Weekly
Hours of Construction Workers, per capita. Demeaned. Source: BLS.
Wage Inflation in Consumption-good Sector Quarterly changes in Average Hourly Earn-
ings of Production/Nonsupervisory Workers on Private Nonfarm Payrolls, Total Private.
Demeaned. Source: BLS.
Wage Inflation in Housing Sector Quarterly changes in Average Hourly Earnings of Pro-
duction/ Non-supervisory Workers in the Construction Industry. Demeaned. Source:
BLS.
Loan-to-value ratio Net credit market assets of US household divided by Value of residential
land. Source: Flow of Funds Accounts of the US and Davis and Heathcote (2007).
B Appendix: Model Equations
Budget constraint for lenders:
ct + qtht + bt +
kc,t
Ak,t
+
∑
i=h,b
ki,t + pl,tlt =
Rt−1bt−1
pit
+ qt(1− δh)ht−1 +
∑
i=c,h
wi,tni,t
Xwi,t
(B1)
+[Rh,tzh,t + 1− δk,h] kh,t−1 +
[
Rc,tzc,t +
1− δk,c
Ak,t
]
kc,t−1 + (pl,t +Rl,t)lt−1 + pb,tkb,t
+Divt − φt − a(zc,t)kc,t−1
Ak,t
− a(zh,t)kh,t−1
First order conditions for lenders:
uc,tqt = uh,t + βGCEt(uc,t+1qt+1(1− δh)) (B2)
uc,t = βGCEt(uc,t+1Rt/pit+1) (B3)
35
uc,t
(
1
Ak,t
+
∂φc,t
∂kc,t
)
= βGCEtuc,t+1
(
Rc,t+1zc,t+1 − a(zc,t+1) + 1− δkc
Ak,t+1
− ∂φc,t+1
∂kc,t
)
(B4)
uc,t
(
1 +
∂φh,t
∂kh,t
)
= βGCEtuc,t+1
(
Rh,t+1zh,t+1 − a(zh,t+1) + 1− δkh − ∂φh,t+1
∂kh,t
)
(B5)
uc,twc,t = unc,tXwc,t (B6)
uc,twh,t = unh,tXwh,t (B7)
uc,t(pbt − 1) = 0 (B8)
RctAkt = a
′(zc,t) (B9)
Rht = a
′(zh,t) (B10)
uc,tpl,t = βGCEtuc,t+1(pl,t+1 +Rl,t+1) (B11)
The budget and borrowing constraint for the borrowers are:
c′t + qth
′
t + [1− Ft(ω¯t)]Rz,tbt−1 = bt +
∑
i=c,h
w′i,tn
′
i,t
X ′wi,t
+ (1− δh)[1− µGt(ω¯t)]qth′t−1 +Div
′
t.(B12)
bt = [Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)]Et
[
(1− δh)qt+1h
′
tpit+1
Rt
]
, (B13)
the first order conditions are:
uc′,tqt = uh′,t + β
′GCEt(uc,t+1qt+1(1− δh)(1− µG(ωt+1)))
+Et
(
λt+1(1− δh)qt+1pit+1
Rt
[Γt+1(ω¯t+1)− µGt+1(ω¯t+1)]
)
(B14)
uc′,t = β
′GCEt(uc′,t+1Rt/pit+1) + λt+1 (B15)
uc′,tw
′
c,t = unc′,tX
′
wc,t (B16)
uc′,tw
′
h,t = unh′,tX
′
wh,t (B17)
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The threshold value ω¯t is determined by:
ω¯t+1(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit−1 = Rz,t−1 bt. (B18)
The lenders’ participation constraint is:
Rtbt =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δ)qt+1h′tpit+1f(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
Rz,tbtf(ω)dω (B19)
Production technologies are:
Yt =
[
Act
(
nαctn
′1−α
ct
)]1−µc
(zctkct−1)
µc (B20)
IHt =
[
Aht
(
nαhtn
′1−α
ht
)]1−µh−µb−µl
(zhtkht−1)
µh kµbbt l
µl
t−1 (B21)
The first order conditions for wholesale goods firms are:
(1− µc)αYt = Xtwc,tnc,t (B22)
(1− µc)(1− α)Yt = Xtw′c,tn′c,t (B23)
(1− µh − µl − µb)αqtIHt = wh,tnh,t (B24)
(1− µh − µl − µb)(1− α)qtIHt = w′h,tn′h,t (B25)
µcYt = XtRc,tzc,tkc,t−1 (B26)
µhqtIHt = Rh,tzh,tkh,t−1 (B27)
µlqtIHt = Rl,tlt−1 (B28)
µbqtIHt = pb,tkb,t (B29)
Phillips curve is:
lnpit − ιpi ln pit−1 = βGc (Et lnpit+1 − ιpi lnpit)− εpi ln
(
Xt
X
)
+ up,t (B30)
Nominal wage inflation is ωi,t = (wi,tpit)/(wi,t−1) for each sector/household. Wage equations
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are as follows:
lnωc,t − ιwc ln pit−1 = βGC(Et lnωc,t+1 − ιwc ln pit)− εwc ln(Xwc,t/Xwc) (B31)
lnω′c,t − ιwc ln pit−1 = β′GC(Et lnω′c,t+1 − ιwc ln pit)− ε′wc ln(Xwc,t/Xwc) (B32)
lnωh,t − ιwh ln pit−1 = βGC(Et lnωh,t+1 − ιwh lnpit)− εwh ln(Xwh,t/Xwh) (B33)
lnω′h,t − ιwh ln pit−1 = β′GC(Et lnω′h,t+1 − ιwh lnpit)− ε′wh ln(Xwh,t/Xwh) (B34)
where εwc = (1− θwc)(1− βGCθwc)/θwc, ε′wc = (1− θwc)(1− β′GCθwc)/θwc, εwh = (1− θwh)(1−
βGCθwh)/θwh, and ε
′
wh = (1− θwh)(1− β′GCθwh)/θwh.
The Taylor rule is:
Rt = (Rt−1)rR
[
pirpit
(
GDPt
GcGDPt−1
)rY
r¯r
]1−rR uRt
st
(B35)
Two market clearing conditions are:
Ct +
IKc,t
Ak,t
+ IKh,t + kb,t = Yt − φt (B36)
ht + h
′
t − (1− δh)
[
ht−1 + h
′
t−1 (1− µGt(ω¯t))
]
= IHt (B37)
Total land is normalized to unity lt = 1. Dividends paid to households are:
Divt =
Xt − 1
Xt
Yt +
Xwc,t − 1
Xwc,t
wc,tnc,t +
Xwh,t − 1
Xwh,t
wh,tnh,t (B38)
Div′t =
X ′wc,t − 1
X ′wc,t
w′c,tn
′
c,t +
X ′wh,t − 1
X ′wh,t
w′h,tn
′
h,t (B39)
Finally, the functional forms for the capital adjustment cost and the utilization rate are:
φt =
φkc
2GIKc
(
kc,t
kc,t−1
GIKc
)2
kc,t−1
(1− γAK)t +
φkh
2GIKh
(
kh,t
kh,t−1
GIKh
)2
kh,t−1 (B40)
a(zc,t) = Rc($z
2
c,t/2 + (1−$)zc,t + ($/2− 1)) (B41)
a(zh,t) = Rh($z
2
h,t/2 + (1−$)zh,t + ($/2− 1)). (B42)
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The shocks are the following:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + uz,t (B43)
ln τt = ρτ ln τt−1 + uτ,t (B44)
ln jt = (1− ρj) ln j + ρj ln jt−1 + uj,t (B45)
ln st = ρs ln st−1 + us,t (B46)
ln
σω,t
σ¯ω
= ρσω ln
σω,t−1
σ¯ω
+ uσω ,t, (B47)
where uz,t, uτ,t, uj,t, uσω ,t and uR,t from Equation (16), are independently and identically dis-
tributed, with variances σ2z , σ
2
τ , σ
2
j , σ
2
ω and σ
2
R, respectively. And, us,t is normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2s .
C Appendix: Lenders’ Participation Constraint and Bor-
rowers’ Budget Constraint
We start with Equation 6, the participation constraint of the lenders:
Rtbt =
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1(1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1f(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
Rz,tbtf(ω)dω,
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and we use the definitions of Gt+1(ω¯t+1) and Γt+1(ω¯t+1), Equations 7 and 8, respectively.
Rewriting the participation constraint yields
Rtbt = (1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1f(ω)dω +Rz,tbt
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
f(ω)dω
= (1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1f(ω)dω + ω¯t+1(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
f(ω)dω
= (1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1
∫ ω¯t+1
0
ωt+1f(ω)dω
+(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1
{
ω¯t+1
∫ ∞
ω¯t+1
f(ω)dω +Gt+1(ω¯t+1)−Gt+1(ω¯t+1)
}
= (1− µ)(1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1Gt+1(ω¯t+1) + (1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1 [Γt+1(ω¯t+1 −Gt+1(ω¯t+1)]
= (1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1 [(1− µ)Gt+1(ω¯t+1) + Γt+1(ω¯t+1 −Gt+1(ω¯t+1)]
Rtbt = (1− δh)qt+1h′tpit+1 [Γt+1(ω¯t+1 − µGt+1(ω¯t+1)]
where from the first to the second step we use the definition of ω¯t+1, Equation 5.
For the budget constraint of the borrowers, we can apply a similar transformation to eliminate
Rz,t. We get:
c′t + qth
′
t +Rtbt−1 = bt +
∑
i=c,h
w′i,tn
′
i,t
X ′wi,t
+ (1− δh)[1− µGt(ω¯t)]qth′t−1 +Div
′
t.
D Appendix: Robustness Checks
Finally, we do two robustness checks. First, we estimate the model for two different subsam-
ples: including and excluding the financial crisis; the two subsamples are 1981Q1-2006Q4 and
1981Q1-2008Q4. We stop at the end of 2008 because in December the monetary policy rate
reached the zero lower bound. As Table D.1 shows, the estimation is robust to the different
periods. We note that the standard deviation of the mortgage risk shock, σω, increases and the
standard deviation of the labor supply shock, στ , falls. These two shocks are important when
explaining the financial crisis. Second, we estimate the model without including the housing
preference shock in the estimation. We do this because this shock gains relevance in comparison
to the results presented by Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and because the mortgage risk shock has
similar effects to the housing demand shock. Table D.2 provides the estimation results for the
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period 1981Q1-2006Q4. The two estimations reveal very similar results. There are very little
changes in the standard deviations of the shocks. However, the mean of the idiosyncratic shock,
σ¯ω, increases almost 9 times. At the steady state, the default rate is higher and is capturing
part of the volatility of the housing demand shocks.
Structural parameters Shocks and measurement errors
1981Q1-2006Q4 1981Q1-2008Q4 1981Q1-2006Q4 1981Q1-2008Q4
Post. Mean Post. Mean Post. Mean Post. Mean
α 0.7440 0.7716 ρAC 0.8648 0.9081
 0.4001 0.4002 ρAH 0.9418 0.9776
′ 0.5846 0.5507 ρAK 0.8840 0.8789
η 0.5434 0.4409 ρj 0.9121 0.9003
η′ 0.5024 0.5122 ρz 0.9434 0.9341
φk,c 14.3053 14.0674 ρσω 0.8965 0.9115
φk,h 10.9936 10.0974 ρτ 0.7884 0.8956
ιpi 0.5039 0.3415 σAC 0.0089 0.0103
ιw,c 0.2381 0.3087 σAH 0.0168 0.0180
ιw,h 0.4491 0.4115 σAK 0.0123 0.0120
ξ -0.7343 0.0345 σj 0.0888 0.1001
ξ′ -0.9747 -1.0605 σR 0.0017 0.0018
rpi 1.6608 1.6269 σz 0.0162 0.0138
rR 0.6828 0.6615 σω 0.2006 0.2225
rY 0.3739 0.3809 στ 0.0412 0.0229
θpi 0.8692 0.8677 σp 0.0031 0.0031
θw,c 0.8645 0.8121 σs 0.0002 0.0002
θw,h 0.8867 0.7659 σn,h 0.0948 0.1380
γAC 0.0048 0.0040 σw,h 0.0055 0.0038
γAH 0.0048 0.0042
γAK 0.0011 0.0020
ζ 0.8759 0.8656
σ¯ω 0.1012 0.1009
Table D.1: Samples Estimates. Different Time Periods, 1981Q1-2006Q4 and 1981Q1-2008Q4
D.1 Steady-State Analysis
Also, we analyze the steady state properties of the estimated model for the different time
periods. Table D.3 presents the results for the estimation until 2006Q4 in the first column
and for the whole time period in the second column. The estimated risk shock σω,t is higher
when we include the crisis period, which is not surprising. Also, the annual default rate on
the mortgages is higher. However, the loan-to-value ratio is not so different in the two time
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Structural parameters Shocks and measurement errors
With aj Without aj With aj Without aj
Post. Mean Post. Mean Post. Mean Post. Mean
α 0.7440 0.7462 ρAC 0.8648 0.8691
 0.4001 0.4010 ρAH 0.9418 0.9247
′ 0.5846 0.5875 ρAK 0.8840 0.8858
η 0.5434 0.5417 ρj 0.9121
η′ 0.5024 0.4973 ρz 0.9434 0.9399
φk,c 14.3053 14.2919 ρσω 0.8965 0.9369
φk,h 10.9936 11.2468 ρτ 0.7884 0.7838
ιpi 0.5039 0.5095 σAC 0.0089 0.0087
ιw,c 0.2381 0.2421 σAH 0.0168 0.0167
ιw,h 0.4491 0.4353 σAK 0.0123 0.0123
ξ -0.7343 -0.7422 σj 0.0888
ξ′ -0.9747 -0.9663 σR 0.0017 0.0017
rpi 1.6608 1.6671 σz 0.0162 0.0159
rR 0.6828 0.6873 σω 0.2006 0.2035
rY 0.3739 0.3624 στ 0.0412 0.0432
θpi 0.8692 0.8717 σp 0.0031 0.0031
θw,c 0.8645 0.8667 σs 0.0002 0.0002
θw,h 0.8867 0.8870 σn,h 0.0948 0.0944
γAC 0.0048 0.0048 σw,h 0.0055 0.0055
γAH 0.0048 0.0046
γAK 0.0011 0.0012
ζ 0.8759 0.8912
σ¯ω 0.1012 0.8959
Table D.2: Samples Estimates. With and Without Housing Preference Shock, 1981Q1-2006Q4
periods. Housing prices are higher if we include the crisis period, and both the borrowers
and lenders have lower housing services. Housing prices are higher because the prices from
2007Q1 until 2008Q4 are higher than the mean of the time series, but clearly, as we show in
Figure 10, Appendix E, there is a drop in house prices. Both lenders and savers also have
lower non-durable good consumption which leads to a lower aggregate consumption. Loans are
also lower, housing investment is half the value of 2006Q4 when we include the financial crisis.
Business investment drops.
E Appendix: Additional Graphs
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2006 2008
Loans 1.5690 1.3315
Consumption Savers 1.4650 1.4273
Consumption Borrowers 0.3792 0.3192
Aggregate Consumption 1.8442 1.7465
Housing Investment 0.1426 0.0765
Business Investment 0.6123 0.5633
Housing Consumption Savers 11.9518 6.5545
Housing Consumption Borrowers 2.3057 1.0907
House prices 0.8936 1.6016
Default rate 2.7196 2.7280
σω,t 0.2006 0.2225
Loan-to-value Ratio 0.7523 0.7529
Table D.3: Steady States Comparison
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Figure 17: Historical Decomposition of Loan-To-Value Ratio
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Figure 18: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters
Note: The gray line is the prior distribution of the parameter, while the black line is the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line corresponds to the mode of the posterior
distribution.
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Figure 19: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters (cont. 1)
Note: The gray line is the prior distribution of the parameter, while the black line is the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line corresponds to the mode of the posterior
distribution.
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Figure 20: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters (cont. 2)
Note: The gray line is the prior distribution of the parameter, while the black line is the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line corresponds to the mode of the posterior
distribution.
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Figure 21: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters (cont. 3)
Note: The gray line is the prior distribution of the parameter, while the black line is the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line corresponds to the mode of the posterior
distribution.
52
−0.02 0 0.02
0
500
1000
1500
2000
TREND_AC
−0.02 0 0.02
0
500
1000
TREND_AH
−0.02 0 0.02
0
500
1000
1500
TREND_AK
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2
4
6
ZETAKC
0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
RHO_SIGMAOM
0.08 0.1 0.12
0
20
40
60
80
SIGMAOMSS
Figure 22: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters (cont. 4)
Note: The gray line is the prior distribution of the parameter, while the black line is the
posterior distribution. The dashed green line corresponds to the mode of the posterior
distribution.
53
